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Abstract   
This paper begins by exploring how traditional Manichean and binary narratives, which are 
familiar to us from fairy-tales, were used to justify the ‘War on Terror’ and then engages critically 
with the feminist and critical scholarship which argues that such narratives helped silence the 
wider geopolitical and legal discussions.  Whilst this paper concurs with the large volume of 
literature that concludes that the heroic narrative obscures the political reality and marginalises the 
subjects of this narrative, it takes issue with some of the assumptions underlying this literature.  
This paper argues that many feminist scholars who critique the heroic narrative of the ‘War on 
Terror’ have fallen victim to the same oversimplification that the narrative itself deploys.  While 
those scholars are correct to identify the operation of the heroic narrative within the rhetoric on the 
‘War on Terror’, their continued focus solely on this narrative masks the more complex racialised, 
Marxist and identity narratives that also operate within this rhetoric.   
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Introduction 
According to Shelley Wright international law would be meaningless without 
narrative.1  She writes that “we cannot imagine what we cannot tell as a story”.2 
This builds on the work of Robert Cover, which argued that all legal tradition is 
part of a complex ‘nomos’- a normative arena that can only be understood through 
familiar narratives- and that one cannot operate in this nomos without an objective 
                                                 
1 Wright (2002) p.233. 
2 Ibid. 
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understanding of these narratives.3  As such, the focus of this paper is on the legal 
and non-legal literature written in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, which argued that 
the dominant discourse focussed on the human rights abuses of Afghan women in 
order to frame the ‘War on Terror’ as a rescue mission, casting the west as the 
hero and the Islamic terrorists and fundamental Taliban as the villain.4  Such 
scholarship utilises Cover’s theories to argue that the military intervention in 
Afghanistan, known as Operation Enduring Freedom, (OEF) was located firmly 
within a heroic narrative that ultimately situates the ‘War on Terror’ as a 
Manichean clash of civilisations. 
 
In order to critique this literature, this paper will firstly outline the construction of 
the heroic narrative in the ‘War on Terror’ and its documented ill effects.  
However, while this paper agrees that a hegemonic discourse representing the 
‘War on Terror’ as a Manichean clash of civilisations does indeed seek to saturate 
and over-determine the debate, it does not support the assertion in much of the 
literature that this was the only narrative interpretation possible.  Instead this 
paper argues that the heroic narrative critique reaches this conclusion by ignoring 
the wider fragmented narratives and focussing too heavily on the co-option of 
human rights rhetoric to justify the intervention.  In doing so, the heroic narrative 
critique fails to truly deconstruct the discourse because although it criticises the 
binary depiction of villains and heroes, it does not adequately question the 
implicit casting of the West as the heroes and the East as the villains in this 
narrative.          
 
As such, this paper criticises this scholarship for being overly attracted to the 
heroic narrative and subscribing to the same binary distinctions it criticises.  It 
therefore concludes that those scholars who highlight the existence of the heroic 
narrative as a rejoinder to hawkish imperialism fail to escape the prism of their 
own experience and engage in reductivist assertions in order to make their claims.  
                                                 
3 Cover (1983). 
4 Hunt and Rygiel (2006); Kolhatkar and Ingalls (2010); Fluri (2008); Ayotte and Husain (2005); 
Charlesworth and Chinkin (2002); Cooke (2002); Heathcote (2005); Hunt (2002); Jiwani (2009); 
Stabile and Kumar (2005); Tickner (2002); Lorber (2002); Cloud (2004). 
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1. The Heroic Narrative 
The idea that human rights and humanitarianism is grounded in familiar 
stereotypical narratives of victims, villains and heroes is not new.  Indeed, Mutua 
argues that such a narrative lies at the heart of the human rights project.5  He 
writes that it is a damning metaphor that “depicts an epochal contest pitting 
savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviours on the other.”6  Indeed 
post-colonial scholarship has established that the arguments espoused by the 
colonial powers to defend their subjugation of third world countries was often 
grounded in this narrative.7  In international law this narrative operates as what 
Anghie and Chimni refer to as the ‘civilising mission’,8 or the idea of “white men 
saving brown women from brown men.”9  That is to say, Western states saving 
Third World women. 
 
Anne Orford and others describe how this narrative underpins international 
intervention by presenting rogue states, ‘despotic dictators’ and ‘fanatical 
terrorists’ as threats to the existing world order.10  Therefore military intervention 
by the West is then considered necessary to remove this threat, restore the existing 
order and save the people who are victims of this disorder.  There are three key 
elements necessary to establish this narrative; the first is a disruption of the 
established symbolic order; the second is that there must be a hero, or ‘white 
knight’ with whom the spectator is invited to identify and finally, the radicalised 
or feminised characters that serve as a background and foil to the actions of the 
hero.   
   
The attraction of this narrative is that it reimagines childhood fairy-tales in which 
the (masculine) hero saves the (feminine) victim from a metaphorical evil.  It is 
important to note that there is no succinct definition as to what is meant by the 
term fairy-tale.  Indeed Smith notes that one of the main problems with the term is 
that many stories considered emblematic do not contain a single fairy.  As such, 
according to Tolkien:  
                                                 
5 Mutua (2001) p.201. 
6 Ibid p.201. 
7 Zine (2006); Anghie and Chimni (2003).  
8Anghie and Chimni (2003) p.85.  
9 Spivak (1988). 
10 See Orford (2003); Orford (1999); Chandler (2006); Mutua (2001). 
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The definition of a fairy-story – what it is, or what it should be – does 
not, then, depend on any definition or historical account of elf or fairy, 
but upon the nature of Faërie: the Perilous Realm itself, and the air 
that blows in that country. I will not attempt to define that, nor to 
describe it directly. It cannot be done.11 
 
It is however true that the classical Western fairy-tale evolved centuries ago when 
storytellers began appropriating different kinds of magical folk tales, which they 
then edited and sanitized to reflect social and moral conventions of the day.  
These tales can be traced back to the oral storytelling traditions of European 
peasants and were appropriated from a particular genre; the magic tale that tended 
to focus on miraculous transformations that allowed the disadvantaged or 
dispossessed to succeed in life.  Although the original tales were intended for 
adults, the continuing popularity of these tales in modern times is attributed to 
Walt Disney, whose films and books are aimed at children.  Indeed it is thought 
that through these films, cartoons and books most children are familiarized with 
the tales.12  Therefore, when referring to fairy-tales, this paper restricts itself to 
this modern “conventionalized or Disneyfied notion” of what constitutes a fairy 
tale.   
 
Jameson argues that this fairy-tale narrative (like many others) transcends fiction 
and permeates our culture.13  As such, in the human rights and humanitarian 
project it is often argued that this narrative exists to attract public support for 
military deployments by allowing ordinary people to buy into the myth that they 
are saving people, when in fact the evidence suggests the contrary.14  As such, the 
well-documented effects of this narrative are that it manages to oversimplify 
complicated geo-political issues; it reasserts a hawkish conservative masculine 
approach to international law and international relations, and it co-opts the 
language of human rights and women’s rights while doing little to further these 
                                                 
11 Tolkien (1965: 16) 
12 Zipes (2006) p.52. 
13 Jameson (1982). 
14 Orford (2003).  
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causes and thereby damages the human rights movement by linking it to 
imperialist foreign policies.15   
2. The Operation of the Heroic (or Fairy tale) 
Narrative in the ‘War on Terror’ 
The Hero 
All good tales require a hero.  This character is obliged to be male and the story is 
invariably told from his perspective.  In the Afghan narrative the heroes are the 
American and British people; variously represented by the soldiers fighting the 
‘War on Terror’ or the ordinary people who continued their lives in the wake of 
terrorist atrocities.  In this way everyone in the West is depicted as heroic and like 
the fairy-tale princes of old these heroes are stoic and determined.  Their pure 
intentions, pursuance of justice and benevolent nature automatically render them 
and their quest magnanimous and altruistic.  
 
While the depiction of militarism or power as chivalrous and just may at first 
appear an oxymoron, it is important to note that such a construction is not 
reserved to the ‘War on Terror’.  It is historically familiar in that support for war 
has often been achieved through such mythmaking.  In ancient times epic 
literature, poetry and folktales such as the Iliad, the Aeneid, Beowulf or the legend 
of King Arthur glorified wars and those who fought in them.  Warriors like 
Achilles were celebrated and their heroics were valorised and immortalised.  As 
such, the depiction of the West and its soldiers as heroic can be seen as a ready-
made and attractive trope.  However, while much of the literature that critiques the 
heroic narrative is correct to highlight the dangers of the hero characterisation, 
particularly for feminism, much of this literature fails to adequately challenge the 
assumptions under which this construction operates.     
i. The Hero as the Saviour 
It has been commented upon that in the days and weeks following 9/11 the White 
House invited Hollywood executives to a meeting where the need to communicate 
                                                 
15 Fluri (2008); Hunt (2002); Kolhatkar (2010); Charlesworth and Chinkin (2002); Enloe (1990); 
Enloe (2004). 
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the aims of the ‘War on Terror’ to the American public was emphasised and their 
assistance invoked.16  Hollywood and the media rose to this challenge by 
saturating America in nostalgic stories of good versus evil where the ‘all-
American’ hero triumphs over his enemies.17  We are told how America 
reacquainted itself with the heroes of childhood, foreshadowing the celebration of 
the new hero: ordinary American men who protect the nation; fire-fighters, police 
officers and construction workers.  
 
As well as being valiant these ordinary Americans were depicted as heroes 
because of their benevolence and generosity to Afghanistan.  President Bush in 
particular reinforced the image of Americans as generous and compassionate 
people.  He spoke of the American children who were raising money for Afghan 
orphans and highlighted how the coalition was dropping food parcels alongside its 
bombs.  
At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the 
generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, 
we’ll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and 
suffering men, women and children of Afghanistan.18     
 
ii. The Hero as ‘Masculine’ 
It was also argued that the invoking of the heroic narrative in the wake of 9/11 
heralded the return of ‘traditional masculinity’ as a normative hegemonic 
ideology.19  This singular view of masculinity was one which relied on 
mythological ‘male’ attributes such as courage, strength, toughness, stoicism and 
the rejection of the soft and feminine.  The evidence for this claim was that, since 
women’s only role in this narrative was as victims, this aided the belief that all 
women were victims and thereby required strong ‘masculine’ men to protect 
them.  It is well established that invoking this paradigm creates a justification for 
increasing militarisation domestically and internationally.20    
 
                                                 
16 Alford (2011). 
17 Faludi (2008) p.6. 
18 Bush (7.10.2001). 
19 Brown (2001); Faludi (2008); Noonan (2001); Dowd (2001). 
20 Enloe (2004); Enloe (1990). 
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As evidence of this return to a strong ‘masculine’ state, many commentators cited 
those who argued that in the post 9/11 world traditional gender roles should be 
embraced as male strength had proved a necessity,21 while numerous press reports 
fixated on the fact that Osama bin Laden had taunted the West for becoming 
feminised and weak.22  It appeared that in letting itself get soft, America had lost 
the ability to defend itself.  This was alluded to by Helene Cixous, who wrote that 
the destruction of the twin towers was analogous to castration.23  Therefore, in 
order to strike back against the terrorists America needed to reassert its 
‘masculinity’.    
 
In some ways this machismo obsession was similar to that seen during the Reagan 
era when, according to Susan Jeffords, ‘hard bodies’ like Reagan’s own came to 
define politics.24  These hard bodies personified strength, aggression and 
determination and were seen in South America and in the fight against 
communism.  They came to represent the epitome of the nation itself and were in 
stark contrast to the “weakened… even feminine” years of the previous 
administration.25   
iii. The Hero as Uncompromising 
The leader of these ‘masculine’ men was President Bush himself who was cast in 
the ultimate western as the righteous sheriff protecting his people from the 
outlaws.  This contemporary re-imagining of the heroic narrative is one that holds 
appeal for many Americans.  Indeed Mead argues that the western is America’s 
founding myth which needs to be continually retold.26  While Buchanan and 
Johnson argue that the narrative of ‘frontier justice’ is deeply embedded within 
American Presidential discourse.27  
 
As such, Bush was frequently depicted in frontier ‘folkisms’ calculated to reassure 
the public and portray him as a capable leader.28  He called for Osama bin Laden 
                                                 
21 Goodstein (2001) Noonan (2001). 
22 Burns (2001).  
23 Cixous (2002) p.431. 
24 Jeffords (1994) p.25. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Mead (2010). 
27 Buchan and Johnson (2005) p.141. 
28 Takacs (2010) p.153. 
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“Dead or Alive”29 and posited the US as the “reluctant gunslinger forced by 
circumstances to resort to violence.”30  Indeed Bush epitomised this 
characterisation when he challenged the world that if it did not support America 
then it would be considered to be in league with the terrorists.31  Such ‘macho’ 
uncompromising language ultimately allowed the Bush Administration to render 
what was a complicated geo-political crisis into a simplistic Manichean 
showdown between the ‘allies’ and the Taliban.  Accepting its role as protector 
and defender, America would have no choice but to reluctantly pursue the ‘bad 
guys’.    
 
Problems with the Hero Construction 
Whilst this characterisation of Bush as the valiant sheriff hunting down outlaws in 
the name of justice perfectly subscribes to the heroic narrative, many scholars 
have failed to acknowledge that such characterisation is actually grounded in 
traditional American political identity.  By analysing the particular foreign policy 
culture and discourse of the US, it can be argued that Bush deliberately crafted a 
discourse that would resonate strongly with republican voters while also appealing 
to the mainstream.32  Such rhetoric appealed because it positioned the US as tough 
and un-beholden to other nations while concomitantly creating a climate of fear 
and paranoia about terrorism and so necessitating military action.  Indeed, 
McLaren notes that the best way of appealing to the American public is for the 
President to appear “uncompromising… unrestrained, confident, anagogic, and 
sometimes allegorical.”33  Therefore it was necessary for Bush to adopt a ‘gung-
ho’ discourse in order to appear commanding and Presidential even though such 
discourse lacked detail, sense or considered analysis.34  
 
However, while it can certainly be argued that the Western media helped to 
construct the heroic narrative around OEF by positioning US military 
masculinity as the saviour of civilisation, merely evidencing this to the re-
                                                 
29 Bush (17th September 2001).  Bush is actually accredited as saying "I want justice, and there's an 
old poster out West, I recall, that says, 'Wanted: Dead or Alive.'" But this was widely reported in 
the media as Bush calling for Bin Laden ‘Dead or Alive’.  See Harnden (2001).  
30 Takacs (2010) p.153. 
31 Bush (20th September 2001).  
32 Holland (2013) p.25. 
33 McLaren (2003) p.327.  
34 Holland (2013). 
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emergence of ‘masculinity’ is problematic.  The main issue with the hero 
construct is that this characterisation itself relies on a one-dimensional view of 
masculinity which is rarely adequately defined.  It is also the case that even 
whilst warning against the stereotypical characterisation of the heroes as 
masculine, such depiction holds an appeal even to those who critique this 
narrative.  This is alluded to by Tickner who, even while criticising the 
masculinisation and gendering of 9/11, notes that there is “something reassuring 
about ‘our men’ protecting us from ‘other men’”.35   
 
Furthermore, such unqualified acceptance of the discourse of one-dimensional 
masculinity is problematic because it promotes a masculinity enshrined in 
heteronormativity.  Indeed Judith Butler argues that there was a hierarchy of 
mourning for the victims of the attacks which privileged “those who were 
married, or on the way to be, heterosexual, happy, monogamous.”36  While, 
several scholars highlight the caricatures of Osama bin Laden being anally 
penetrated by the Empire State Building;37 imagery designed to both taunt and 
humiliate.38  In order for the West to reassert its dominance and ‘masculine’ 
superiority the narrative requires that it demonise and dehumanise the third-world 
‘other’ by rendering him feminine and effeminate.  While much critical 
scholarship on the heroic narrative highlights the danger of promoting a dualist 
view of western masculinity versus eastern femininity, it fails to adequately 
address the unequal power dynamics which operate to allow the West to hold this 
view and as such, inadvertently promotes the heteronormative trope which 
underpins this discourse on ‘masculinity’.  
3. Depictions of the ‘Other’ in the ‘War on Terror’ 
Rhetoric 
The heroic narrative literature further tells us that once the US was firmly 
positioned as the heroic ‘masculine’ entity willing to fight against evil to protect 
the innocent; it became necessary to construct both a villain and a victim to 
complete the narrative because, as Mutua tells us, such characters are 
                                                 
35 Tickner (2002) p.339. 
36 Butler (2004) p.32. 
37 Philipose (2008); Puar and Rai (2002). 
38 Philipose (2008). 
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interdependent.39  Indeed both Orford and Mutua note that the heroic narrative is 
actually an inherent construction of how the west sees itself.  Writing on how this 
narrative operated during the first Gulf War, Heathcote states that “When the 
West uses force to ‘save’ another state, it is not the Bedoon or the Kurdish people 
for whom the narratives are written: the narratives are stories and histories for 
the West to reflect back its own image.”40  The image in question is of course that 
the West is heroic and benevolent and by casting ourselves as the hero this 
position is never questioned.   
   
However, while the casting of the hero proved unproblematic it was somewhat more 
difficult to cast the villain.  In the early days after 9/11 the US Government claimed 
that Osama bin Laden and the terrorist organisation Al Qaeda were most likely 
responsible for the attack.  However, rather than mount an offensive solely against Al 
Qaeda (or pursue them through criminal channels) the US made clear that it would 
also pursue the Taliban de facto Government of Afghanistan that was reportedly 
sheltering bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists, even though there was little evidence 
linking the Taliban to 9/11.41  Clearly the US was aware that an offensive mounted 
solely against private actors, even if those actors were terrorists, had no basis in 
international law as self-defence is only appropriate when a state is attacked by 
another state42 or when the actions of private individuals can be attributed to another 
state.  Terrorism has hitherto rarely been regarded as the work of a state because 
terrorist conduct usually cannot be adequately attributed to a state.43  Therefore, the 
US knew it would be prudent to attribute international responsibility for 9/11 to the 
Taliban (and therefore the state of Afghanistan) as well as Al Qaeda in order to face 
less opposition internationally and make UN SC endorsement less controversial.  As 
such, in most mainstream media the Taliban and Al Qaeda came to be seen as one and 
the same, perhaps because of the US Administration’s insistence on vilifying them 
both.   
                                                 
39 Mutua (2001). 
40 Heathcote (2005) p.149. 
41 The only official account that linked the Taliban to the attacks was a report released by the 
British Government.  UK Government Press Release (2001).  However, the 9/11 Commission 
would later conclude that there was no evidence and that it was highly unlikely that the Taliban 
had been involved in planning or sanctioning the attacks.  The Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004). 
42 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004, 
43 ILM 1009, 1050 (2004). 
43 GRAY, C. D. 2008. International law and the use of force, Oxford University Press 
London.p.195-198. 
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The Villain 
One of the simplest ways to encourage support for war is to demonise one’s 
enemies.  Historically this involved merely articulating and exaggerating very real 
fears that people had about other cultures or civilisations.  During WWI the allies 
demonised the Germans by disseminating stories of their alleged atrocities; stories 
such as Belgian babies being ripped apart by German soldiers or the German army 
boiling corpses to render them for fat and oil.44  Although these stories were 
wholly fabricated by the British propaganda machine they were used to great 
effect by both the US and UK.45  However this technique has endured to today 
and it continues to play on people’s fears of the ‘other’.  Indeed, Harold Lasswell 
observed how, during World War I, officials decried “the insolence and depravity 
of the enemy”46 and as such he identified a “cult of Satanism” that demonised the 
enemy so war could be justified.47   
i. The Villain as Inhuman 
It is interesting that Lasswell used the term Satanism.  This suggests it is not 
enough to portray one’s enemy as wicked but as non-human.  This construction of 
the enemy as non-human is done to exploit our perception of others because: “If 
certain lives are not perceivable as lives, and this includes sentient beings who are 
not human, then the moral prohibition against violence will only be selectively 
applied.”48  This way ‘civilised’ society can be secure of its own identity by 
juxtaposing it with demons and madmen.  As Foucault reminds us “men were men 
because they were not monsters.”49 
 
Highlighting this juxtaposition, Johnson and Buchanan demonstrate that in the 
heroic narrative the villain is identified by endowing him with traits that are 
binary opposites of those possessed by the hero.50  Such depictions provide clear 
cues to the audience as to whom they should identify with and whom they should 
vilify.   
                                                 
44 Jowett and O'Donnell (2011) p.163. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Lasswell (1971) p.78. 
47 Ibid p.96. 
48 Butler (2009) p51. 
49 Foucault (1965). 
50 Buchanan and Johnson (2005). 
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ii. Monsters and Demons in the ‘War on Terror’ 
Consequently, in the ‘War on Terror’ narrative both the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
were portrayed as outlaws and as barbarous savages.  President Bush initially 
stated that “barbarians had declared war on America”.51  We were then told how 
the Taliban were similarly evil and irrational fundamentalists.  He was also quick 
to describe the ‘War on Terror’ as a war of “good versus evil”.52  Indeed, he 
frequently referred to the perpetrators as “evil doers”53 and called them an enemy 
that “preys on innocent and unsuspecting people.”54  In this way, by constructing 
his enemies as ‘evil’ Bush was able to desensitise the public to the destruction of 
fellow humans.  Indeed Anderson tells us that the function of such language is to 
purposely stifle discussion as to alternative reactions.55  It also separates “the 
evildoer from the ranks of humanity” thereby making it morally acceptable to 
destroy such people without qualms or legal scrutiny.56  Bush continued to use 
language such as the ‘evil doers’ to reinforce that morality was on the side of the 
US while at the same time emphasising that these individuals were without 
conscience or humanity.  Depictions such as this mean that “the terrorist is 
transformed through the authors’ rhetoric from an ordinary deviant into a 
frightening ‘foreign’ barbaric beast at the same time that extra-normal means are 
called for to fight terrorism.”57  Such cartography, according to Gregory, was 
“designed to bring relief to ‘us’ while bringing ‘them’ into relief; at once 
therapeutic and a vengeful gesture, its object was to reveal the face of the other as 
other.”58    
 
However a more radical interpretation of this demonisation, which the heroic 
narrative literature fails to address, is that monsters or villains are in fact 
metaphors for our own demons and reflect our own true self.  As such, “Monsters 
are our Others par excellence.  Without them we know not what we are.  With 
them we are not what we know.”59  While much scholarship correctly warns of 
                                                 
51 Bush (15.09.2001)  
52 Bush (11.9. 2001). 
53 Bush (19.9.2001). 
54 Bush (11.9.2001). 
55 Anderson (2006). 
56 Ibid.p.726. 
57 Porras (1994) p.121. 
58 Gregory (2004) p.49. 
59 Kearney (2003) p.28. 
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the danger of orientalist depictions of monstrous evil Muslim men, it fails to 
engage with the assertion that such monstrous depictions are our true image.  As 
Devetak warns, “monsters have the unsettling effect of destabilising the very 
categories and oppositions that Bush and others presuppose.”60  Therefore, while 
much has been written on the heroic narrative’s operation in the ‘War on Terror’ 
and its need to juxtapose the villain with the hero, there is little analysis or 
criticism in this literature of the default construction of Al Qaeda or the Taliban as 
the villain.  Instead, most scholarship implicitly affirms the characterisation of 
both the villain and the hero and instead merely engages in a critique of the 
depiction of Afghan women as victims.  Therefore, it is important to recognise 
that, despite its apparent attraction there are problems with this default 
identification.  Critical scholarship may baulk at the utilisation of Manichean 
narratives and one-dimensional characters in the mainstream discourse on the 
‘War on Terror’, however such scholarship itself always approaches the narrative 
from the perspective that the West is naturally the hero and fails to question or 
subvert this assumption.  Instead the real danger and absurdity of the heroic 
narrative’s subjective reductivism would become apparent if the scholarship 
demonstrated how bin Laden is equally capable of utilising such a narrative to 
demonise the West and portray his followers as heroes.   
 
Furthermore, with regard to Al Qaeda, it may be the case that rather than them 
being intrinsically evil, such abhorrence and vilification reflects discomfort with 
an essential ‘otherness’.  The rhizomal nature of Al Qaeda has meant that 
conventional warfare has been rendered superfluous and ineffective and whilst 
guerrilla tactics hold a logical appeal to terrorist organisations, Al Qaeda’s failure 
to engage in established warfare or criminality tactics furthers our distrust of 
them.  Indeed it has even been suggested that their ‘mystique’ is a result of their 
“apparent panoptic power”61 in that they were able to see and monitor everyday 
life and culture in the US, but did not allow the West to see their true selves.  
Instead they dissolved into shadow and nothingness.  Saniotis argues that the 
West’s discomfort stems as much from knowing that the terrorists are outsiders 
than that they are evil.  However there is little willingness to discuss why the 
categorisation of evil holds such allure, even for those who highlight the existence 
                                                 
60 Devetak (2005) p.642. 
61 Saniotis (2005) p.536. 
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of the heroic narrative.  While the literature is correct to highlight the one-
dimensional construction of the villain figure it does not go far enough and fails to 
ask what this depiction says about us.  Presumably because, as Kearney reminds 
us, “The monster remains a personification of our repressed Other.  It functions as 
that negative mirror-image of ourselves.”62 
4. Depicting and Deconstructing the ‘Damsel in 
Distress’ 
In the traditional fairy-tale narrative the ‘damsel in distress’ is a young woman 
who is viewed as virtuous and chaste.  She is epitomised by characters such as 
Sleeping Beauty, Cinderella or Snow White as she is invariably in danger or 
difficulty but lacks the agency or capacity to save herself.  Instead the reader is 
invited to sympathise with her plight and then rejoice when she is rescued by the 
hero. Karen Rowe describes this character as ‘impotent’ and notes how she is 
“unable to act independently or self-assertively; she relies on external agents for 
rescue.”63  Furthermore, while the damsel’s plight may be one of impending 
mortal peril which evokes sympathy, the nature of the story is not to wholly 
engage with the causes of this plight but instead for it to serve as a plot device 
against which the hero can operate.  Similarly in the ‘War on Terror’ narrative the 
focus on the hero means that the causes of terror are not wholly engaged with.  
Instead, in this trope the oppressed women of Afghanistan were depicted as the 
helpless but blank damsels awaiting rescue by the heroic western soldiers. 
 
The Appeal of the Rescue Trope 
Much of the heroic narrative literature notes how this trope was adopted almost 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks.  Indeed on the 17th November 2001, First Lady 
Laura Bush delivered the President’s address to the nation.  She told the American 
public that women in Afghanistan must not be forgotten and how the “brutal 
oppression of women was a goal of the terrorists”.  Similarly, in the UK Cherie 
Booth (wife of Prime Minister Tony Blair) made a speech highlighting the plight 
of Afghan women.  In the days and weeks that followed, the US Government 
                                                 
62 Kearney (2003) p.29. 
63 Rowe (1979) p.239. 
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released a document titled ‘The Taliban’s War Against Women’.64  This 
document emphasised that the ‘War on Terror’ was also in part, on behalf of 
women and children.   
 
Reflecting Mutua’s observation of the interdependency of the narrative characters, 
to complement the perfect villain, the perfect victim needed to be sourced.  Before 
2001 very few people outside of the human rights movement were familiar with 
the Taliban.  In the international arena, the United Nations Security Council 
passed several resolutions requiring the Taliban to act against terrorism, while the 
Human Rights Council and its predecessor reported on the Taliban’s violation of 
Human rights throughout the 1990’s.  The Taliban’s treatment of women in 
Afghanistan was also the subject of a campaign by the Feminist Majority 
Foundation.  However, prior to 9/11 such condemnation had gone virtually un-
noticed.  Now this fundamentalist organisation that had imposed an orthodox 
interpretation of sharia law on a poor and war torn country was front-page news.  
The Taliban were derided as barbarous medieval monsters who hated women 
almost as much as they hated the West.65  Their treatment of Afghan women was 
soon a prominent discussion in many newspapers and on numerous TV shows.  
Depictions of Afghan women forced to wear the all-encompassing burqa ran 
alongside accounts of woman and girls prevented from attending school, 
accessing healthcare or leaving their homes unaccompanied.     
 
However, the heroic narrative literature correctly asserts that such a focus on the 
plight of Afghan women was highly sensationalised and reductivist, and in 
keeping with the fairy-tale depiction, paid little heed to the reality or background 
of most Afghan women.  Instead, Afghan women were offered as victims for the 
West to save in the ‘War on Terror’.  Indeed, according to Michaele Ferguson, the 
highlighting of women’s rights was merely another strategy for further 
emphasising the barbarous and evil nature of the Taliban while emphasising to the 
public that they were as much the villain as Al Qaeda: “Those who respect their 
women are civilised, those who do not are barbarians.”66  Yet, this equivalence 
was problematic because legally the Taliban were only guilty of a breach of a due-
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diligence obligation to hand over bin Laden, rather than as sponsors of terrorist 
attacks.    
 
Similarly, Sonali Kolhatkar argues that Afghan women were simply utilised as a 
visual justification for the military action.67  She notes how the Taliban’s 
treatment of women was sensationalised and seized on by the western media in 
order to further amplify the narrative.  She describes how Karen Hughes, a 
counsellor to President Bush, designed a publicity campaign for the White House 
that widely publicised the suffering of Afghan women.  Hughes remarked that she 
highlighted the women’s plight merely to demonstrate the “cruel and evil nature 
of the people we were up against” rather than as a rallying call to improve the 
women’s lives.68   
 
Indeed, much of the literature focusses on the hypocrisy of Western leaders and 
the media in depicting Afghan women as the oppressed subjects for whose benefit 
the ‘War on Terror’ would be fought.69  Such scholarship is correct to assert how 
the depiction of Afghan women as victims ultimately rendered them silent 
however it does not go far enough because that scholarship itself only sees them as 
one-dimensional and tellingly does not engage with the women themselves. 
 
The Effect of the Rescue Trope: Silencing Afghan Women 
Afghan women’s groups were demonstrably vocal immediately before and after 
the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, however they were often ignored.70  This 
would become a recurring theme throughout discourses about Afghan women: the 
lack of agency given to Afghans and their opinion on the US intervention.  Brittain 
notes the criticism of the Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) “for claiming a 
foremost role in ‘freeing’ Afghan women and failing to give ‘any credit to the 
independent Afghan women who stayed in Afghanistan’ and worked against the 
Taliban.”71  Meanwhile the Afghan Women Network, a group whose members 
were professional Afghan refugee women in Pakistan, reported that they were left 
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“confused, insulted, hurt, angry and substantially ignored”72 by the UN Gender 
Mission on its visit to Pakistan.  The group criticised the Mission’s Head Angela 
King for failing to spend any time with “actual Afghan women” yet purporting to 
speak on their behalf at the UN.73  As such, Fluri notes how, while they were 
highlighting women’s rights in Afghanistan and drawing attention to Taliban 
atrocities such as stoning, the FMF failed to credit the Revolutionary Association 
of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), a prominent and active Afghan women’s 
organisation, for filming the atrocities and in doing so alerting the wider world to 
the situation.74  Indeed, although RAWA is a strong grass roots organisation with 
valuable expertise in providing social programs to women, it has been 
marginalised by the west (perhaps because of its revolutionary mandate and 
Marxist leanings) and so gives further credence to the accusation that women as 
victims merely provide a potent symbol around which to marshal support for the 
‘War on Terror’. 
 
In view of this, such scholarship is correct to highlight how the one-dimensional 
characterisation of the damsel in distress can and did result in the silencing of 
Afghan women.  However, whilst the scholarship is correct to highlight the effect 
of this characterisation- it fails to focus that same critique on the West’s 
characterisation of itself in the narrative.  Post-colonial scholarship tells us that the 
depiction of Afghan women solely as victims suggests that that the West feels 
more comfortable viewing them as passive objects that cannot speak for 
themselves, however as Spivak warns, there are insurmountable problems when 
Western feminists try to speak for third world women.75  Yet the scholars who 
critique the heroic narrative often fall foul of this warning and fail to convince why 
they are immune from such imperialist construction.  
 
Instead much of the heroic narrative critique highlights how the media’s co-option 
of Afghan women’s oppression is dangerous to feminism.  We are told that in 
addition to the heroic narrative simplifying the climate of intervention it also 
raises false expectations of the outcome of that intervention.  In subscribing to this 
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narrative in order to feel safe and protected, Americans told themselves that their 
military would help improve the lives of Afghan women even when there is little 
evidence to suggest that this would be the likely outcome.  Indeed many scholars 
have analysed the rhetoric that championed Afghan women’s rights and they 
demonstrate that even in the early days of 2001, the Bush Administration was 
never sincere in its desire to promote women’s rights.76  Indeed, while it utilised 
the language of feminism to sell the ‘War on Terror’, the preoccupation with 
Afghan women’s rights allowed it to encroach on women’s rights in domestic 
politics causing American women to experience severe cutbacks in 
unemployment compensation, disability insurance, health benefits, and access to 
reproductive choice.’77  Furthermore, the US is also one of only a handful of states 
that are not party to the CEDAW.  
 
However in its attempt to highlight this pertinent point, such scholarship often 
ignores the diverse range of women, or give credit to Afghan women with 
opposing views and therefore may inadvertently marginalise or negate the 
experience of those women who suffered very real harm or oppression and who 
may be correct to look to outside militaries or regimes for assistance.  By overly 
focussing on the depiction of women as victims and how this silences women, the 
heroic narrative literature fails to address the fact that actual women may benefit 
from military action. 
5. The Limitations of the Heroic Narrative Critique 
The heroic narrative literature cautions those feminist activists and scholars who 
were willing to endorse the promulgation of the heroic narrative because they 
were aware of the heightened exposure it could bring.  Because of such 
complicity, there was little discussion in the media of the complicated geo-politics 
that affected Afghanistan or of the rich and diverse cultures adopted by its people.  
Instead, Kolhatkar writes that the over-simplified narrative sensationalised the 
Taliban abuse by implying that Afghan women’s oppression was limited to the 
burqa and that burqa-clad women needed saving from the Taliban by the West.78  
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She also notes how little attempt was made to understand the nature and history of 
the burqa or its origins.  Instead the media mainly implied that before the 
‘barbarous’ Taliban, Afghan women had been free and lived parallel lives to 
western women.  Freeing them from their burqas, or unveiling them, was the key 
to liberating women to lead western style lives.  Such homogenised accounts of 
Afghan women and their lives make over-generalized claims about women and 
subscribe to gender and culture essentialism.79   
 
However, like those they critique, the scholars who highlight the operation and 
dangers of the heroic narrative are similarly only able to view the women of 
Afghanistan as passive, silent and oppressed.  Even by critiquing the role of the 
‘damsel in distress’ the scholarly critique continues to homogenise and 
standardise the accounts of Afghan women in order to present a neat and logical 
rebuttal of this victim status.  While such literature is correct in many of the 
criticisms it raises, the reality is that Afghan women as a collective can be neither 
completely passive nor fully autonomous agents and yet the many conflicting 
voices of the women themselves are very rarely engaged with, far less critiqued.  
Instead it is those who eschew behaviour that rejects their status as victims who 
are celebrated by the authors and those whose suffering made the western news 
that are inadvertently juxtaposed by such scholarship.  In attempting to 
demonstrate how the heroic narrative renders all Afghan women victims and how 
this is problematic, the critique itself falls victim to a similar failure.  In focussing 
solely on women’s victimisation and silence, this critique ignores the flaws in its 
own argument.  It does not adequately address the issue of those women who 
chose to assert their own voice but in doing so affirm the dominant understanding 
that many Afghan women are victims of oppression, and due to the patriarchal 
norms and practices of their society, face insurmountable difficulties in changing 
this reality and so may actually benefit from outside assistance. 
The Failure to Engage with Less Palatable Narratives 
i. The US as the Victim and the Need for Retribution 
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks there was an understandable 
raw outpouring of emotion from both public and authority figures.  However, 
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according to Jackson this was evolved into a “myth of exceptional grievance,”80 
the main purpose and consequence of which was to establish and solidify 
America’s status as the victim.  However, a consequence of this grievance myth is 
that it removes moral responsibility and accountability for counter-violence.  
Indeed Jackson argues that one of the most horrific consequences of perpetuating 
the trope of victimhood-through both the language and practices of officials, such 
as showing army recruits footage of 9/11- was the gross human rights violations at 
Abu Ghraib prison.  By reinforcing the belief that the USA was the victim and not 
the aggressor, the “discursive construction of exceptional suffering made the daily 
humiliations handed out to prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison seem inconsequential 
compared with the atrocity of 9-11.”81      
 
Despite this, the trope of American victimisation, with its appalling effects, was 
rarely commented upon, particularly by those feminist authors who sought to 
establish how the US was conforming to the heroic narrative by focussing on 
tropes of ‘masculinity’.  Again this suggests that the heroic narrative critique 
proves an attractive frame through which to situate the ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric.  
So attractive that it allows scholars to ignore the darker and more fragmented 
gothic narratives that also abound.  The lone exception to this silence was Judith 
Butler who advocated harnessing this sense of vulnerability and loss to create a 
positive feminist response to 9/11 rather than one based on “violent acts of 
sovereignty”82  She asks why experiences of fear and grief must automatically 
lead to military violence and retribution and suggests an alternative approach: a 
globalised humanity through which to frame the 9/11 attacks.83 
The dislocation from first world privilege, however temporary, 
offers a chance to start to imagine a world in which that violence 
might be minimised, in which an inevitable interdependency 
becomes acknowledged as the basis for global political community.84 
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Ignoring Alternative Discourse 
One example of a less simplistic narrative was Tony Blair’s conceptualisation of 
the ‘War on Terror’ as a kindness to the world community and also to the people 
of Afghanistan.  The effect of his imagery was admittedly the same; the British 
public conceptualised the invasion of Afghanistan and the wider ‘War on Terror’ 
as an act of benevolence and liberation towards the people of Afghanistan.  
However, although this was grounded in tropes borrowed from heroic and 
colonial narratives of saving people, it relied on a more nuanced approach to 
international relations and the theme of saving Afghan women did not feature 
prominently in the discourse.  Notions of saving women were incorporated into 
wider British tropes about spreading human rights and creating a fairer world. 
There was much talk of the intervention in Afghanistan being difficult but 
necessary: the right thing to do.85  Indeed Blair strongly focused on promoting 
global human rights and equality as a means of tackling the increasing terrorist 
threat.86  Even the Iraq War would later be justified by “humanitarianism as well 
as determinism”.87  Furthermore, Blair also saw the Arab/Israeli conflict as being 
intrinsically linked to the success of the ‘War on Terror’ and advised the US to 
restart the peace process.88  
 
In view of this, it is argued that while the heroic narrative of saving women is an 
appealing and enduring one, it was not the only narrative underpinning OEF.  
Particularly as regards the US rhetoric, the initial narratives centred on retaliation, 
retribution and portraying a stronger America.  It was only after the military 
operation commenced that the US elevated the humanitarian heroic narrative to 
the forefront.  This is confirmed by Wolfe, who argues that OEF as a 
humanitarian mission emerged as an idealist thematic frame which peaked after 
the military operation was sanctioned.89  He notes that this fits the familiar pattern 
whereby after the initial show of strength and prowess there is often a need for an 
emotional, as well as a rational appeal to go to war.  Humanitarianism helps actors 
                                                 
85 Holland, ‘Blair's War on Terror: Selling Intervention to Middle England’. 
86 N.L. Fairclough, ‘Blairs contribution to elaborating a new doctrine of international community’ 
4 Journal of Language and Politics 41. 
87 P. Hoggett, ‘Iraq: Blair's mission impossible’ 7 The British Journal of Politics & International 
Relations 418, p.422. 
88  Coughlin, American ally: Tony Blair and the war on terror, p.164. 
89 Wolfe (2008). 
22 
to believe they are doing a good deed even when they are waging war.  Therefore 
once the coalition military might was turned on the people of Afghanistan there 
was a need to reposition OEF within this alternative narrative.  However it is 
interesting that feminist scholars were so keen to focus their critique on this 
particular narrative at the expense of others.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper sought to explore how the familiar heroic narrative operated post 9/11 
and draw attention to the failures of the critique of this narrative in contemporary 
scholarship.   
 
It has argued that the major failing with most scholarly attributions of the heroic 
narrative is the failure to recognise that the narrative can just as easily be 
appropriated by the ‘other’ and reversed to cast him as the hero and the US as the 
villain.  Despite the unassailable logic of this, there is reluctance on the part of 
Western scholars to acknowledge that the male characters in the narrative are 
entirely interchangeable and therefore we can gain little insight from them.  
Therefore it is necessary to be wary and mindful of this when attributing 
narratives to international events.  Such readiness to affirm the heroic narrative 
and the West’s position as the hero ought to be questioned because we can learn 
little from such depictions if we do not admit that such a tendency exists. 
 
A re-reading of this narrative highlights how the heroic narrative itself projects a 
dangerous Western image on all the characters and equally posits their salvation 
(both the victim and villain’s) through becoming less ‘other’ and more like us.  
Such a critique might invoke Devotaks’s postmodern gothic narratives as an 
alternative reading of the ‘War on Terror’ to allow weakness, fear, desolation and 
mistrust to feature and therefore reflect our very real anxieties. 
 
 
Furthermore, in the heroic narrative which positions the ‘civilised against the 
barbarians’, the ‘innocent against the damned’ and the ‘courageous against the 
cowards’, the self and the ‘other’ have already been cast.  As such, this narrative 
calls for the rescue of the feminine victim by making her into the image of 
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ourselves but fails to bestow her with any personality or autonomy.  Therefore, 
the heroic narrative holds an enduring appeal as the dominant and encompassing 
narrative, not only to mainstream audiences but to critical scholars, because not 
only do we identify with (and as) the hero- and rescue the victim- we make her 
like us and through this transformation the villain is vanquished and our heroics 
confirmed.  The attraction of the heroic trope is as enduring to feminist scholars, 
who inadvertently cast themselves as heroes through their ability to speak for 
Afghan women, as it is for the mainstream Western media.   
 
However, while much of the scholarship that draws parallels between Afghan 
women and damsels in need of rescue is problematic due to its refusal to engage 
with the concomitant narratives, such scholarship does highlight a pertinent point; 
that when politicians claim to be acting in the name of women’s rights, such 
campaigns run the risk of being misappropriated and reduced to mere rhetoric.  
Indeed Hunt and Rygiel are correct to state that, far from being a war for women’s 
rights, the ‘War on Terror’ is, “in fact a war on women’s rights.”90   
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